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858 DE BURGH 11. DE BURGH [39 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 21986. In Bank. Nov. 25, 1952.] 
DA1SY M. DE BURGH, Appellant, v. ALBERT RAYMOND 
DE BURGH, Respondent. 
[1] Divorce - Extreme Cruelty - Justification - Provocation. -
Cruelty that is provoked does not give rise to a cause of 
action for divorce. 
[2] Id.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-To estab-
lish recrimination, a cause of divorce must be shown. (Civ. 
Code, § 122.) 
[3] Id.-Defenses-Provocation and Recrimination.-Provoeation 
and recrimination are not complementary, but mutually ex-
clusive, defenses in divorce cases. 
[4] Id.-Extreme Cruelty-Justification-Provocation.-To justify 
extreme cruelty by one spouse under the doctrine of provoca-
tion, the misconduct of the other spouse must itself be a serious 
violation of marital obligations. 
[6] Id.-Extreme Cruelty-Justi1ication-Provocation.-Evidence 
in wife's divorce action that defendant's acts of cruelty took 
place from date of marriage until separation of parties, and 
defendant's concession at trial that his allegations of plaintiff's 
cruelty were based solely on her accusations that he was dis-
honest and a homosexual, charges that were made no earlier 
than two or three days before the separation, do not sustain 
a judgment denying plaintiff a divorce on the theory that de-
fendant's cruelty was provoked by her. 
[6] Id. - Causes for Denying Divorce:- Recrimination. - Every 
showing by defendant of a cause of divorce does not constitute 
an absolute or a recriminatory defense; under Civ. Code, I 
§§ 111, 122, there is the additional requirement that such a 
cause of divorce must be "in bar" of plaintiff's cause of divorce. 
[7] Id-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-Defense of 
recrimination may be asserted in a divorce action without 
regard to whether plaintiff or defendant was the first at fault. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 35; Am.Jur., Divorce 
and Separation, § 85. 
[2] Recrimination as an absolute or qualified defense in divorce 
cases, note, 170 A.L.R. 1076. See, also, Cal.Jur., Divorce and Sepa-
ration, § 58; Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 233. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,4,5] Divorce, §23; [2,6,7,11-19) 
Divorcl', ~ 60: f3] Divorce, §§ 23, 60; [8] Marriage, § 1 j [9,10] 
Divorce, § 5; [20] Trial, § 286; [21] Divorce, §§ 198, 234(2); 
[22] Divorce, § 198; [23] Divorce, § 234(2). 
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[8] Marriage-Nature of Relation.-Marriage is a great deal more 
than a contract, and it ~lIn he terminated only with the con-
sent of the state. 
[9] Divorce-Public Policy.-In a divorce proceeding the court 
must consider not merely the rights and wrongs of the parties 
as in contract litigation, but the public interest in the institu-
tion of marriage. 
[10] !d.-Public Policy.-Public policy does not discourage divorce 
where the relations between husband and wife are such that 
the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed. 
[11] Id.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-Civ. Code. 
§ 122, requiring that defendant prove a cause of divorce against 
plaintiff to establish the defense of recrimination, is a de-
parture from the former rule that plaintiff be "without re-
proach," and rejects the strict rule of recrimination of the 
ecclesiastical courts. 
[12] Id.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-Respect 
for the public interest has formed the basis of a recognized 
exception to the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, with 
which the defense of recrimination has become increasingly 
identified since enactment of the Civil Code. 
[13] ld.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-In enact-
ing Civ. Code, § 122, the Legislature intended that in divorce 
litigation the fault of the plaintiff should have no more sig-
nificance than elsewhere in the law. 
[14] ld.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-Rule that 
equity does not deny relief on the ground of plaintiff's unclean 
hands when to do so would be harmful to the public interest 
is particularly appropriate in marital litigation, where the 
social consequences of the court's decree are of the utmost 
importance. 
[15] Id.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-The doc-
trine of recrimination, like the doctrine of unclean hands of 
which it is a part, is neither puristic nor mechanical, but an 
equitable principle to be applied according to the circumstances 
of each case and with a proper respect for the paramount in- , 
terests of the community at large. (Disapproving Stoeasey v. . 
Sweasey, 126 Cal. 123, 129-130, 58 P. 456; Mattson v. Mattson, 
181 Cal. 44, 47, 183 P. 443; HeZpZing v. HeZpZing, 50 CaI.App. 
676,680-681,195 P. 715; Brazell v. Brazell, 54 Ca1.App.2d 458, 
459, 129 P.2d 117; and Gough v. Gough, 101 Cal.App.2d 262, 
268-269, insofar as these cases support a mechanical application 
of the doctrine of recrimination.) 
[16] Id.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-Giv. Code, 
§ 122, imposes on the trial judge the duty to determine whether 
the fault of plaintiff in a divorce action is to be regarded as 
) 
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"in bar" of plaintiff's cause of divorce based on the fault of 
defendant. 
[17] Id.-Ca.uses for Denying Divorce-Recrimina.tion.-Applica-
tion of strict rule of recrimination in wife's divorce action 
does 1I0t operate with equal justice where defendant, as the 
SpOUSI' entrusted by law with management and control of the 
community property (Civ. Code, §§ 161a, 172, 172a), is in a 
position to use that property for his personal benefit and 
has a large discretion as to performance of his obligation 
to support plaintiff. 
[18] Id.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-There can 
be no precise formula for determining when a cause of action 
shown against a plaintiff is to be considered a bar to his 
suit for divorce, for the divorce court, as a court of equity, is 
clothed with a broad discretion to advance the requirements 
of justice in each particular case. 
[19a, 19b] Id.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-To 
decide the issue raised by a plea of recrimination in a divorce 
case, the court should consider the prospect of reconciliation, 
including the ages and temperaments of the parties, the length 
of their marriage, the seriousness and frequency of their 
marital misconduct, the duration and apparent finality of 
separation, etc. j the effect of the marital conflict on the parties, 
their children, and the community; and the comparative fault 
or guilt of the parties. 
[20] 'l'rial-Findings-Neeessity for.-It is essential that findings 
be made on every material issue raised by the pleadings. 
[21] Divorce - Permanent Alimony: Disposition of Community 
Property.-If a divorce is granted one party where both parties 
were guilty of acts of cruelty against the other, alimony and 
more than half of the community property may be awarded 
to the prevailing spouse as in any other case. 
[22] Id.-Permanent Alimony.-If a divorce is granted to both 
parties, alimony may be awarded to either, for the basis of 
liability for alimony is the granting of a divorce against the 
person required to pay it. (See Civ. Code, § 139.) 
[23] Id.-Disposition of Community Property.-When a divorce is 
granted to both parties for acts of cruelty by each against the 
other, neither party is innocent within the meaning of the 
rule permitting an award of more than half of the community 
property only to an innocent spouse (see eiv. Code, § 146), 
and the community property must be equally divided. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. 
Julius V. Patrosso, Judge. JUdgment reversed; appeal from 
order dismissed. 
Nov. 1952] DE BURGH V. DE BURGH 
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Action and cross-action for divorce. Judgment denying 
divorce to either party, reversed. 
Max Fink, Jerry Rolston, Cyrus Levinthal and Leon E. 
Kent for Appellant. 
Donald Armstrong for Respondent. 
THA YKOR, J .-Plaintiff Daisy M. De Burgh and defend-
ant Albert Raymond Dc Burgh were married in California 
in October, 1946. They separated in February, 1949, and 
in the same year plaintiff brought this action for divorce on 
the ground of extreme cruelty. Defendant filed a cross-
complaint for divorce, also on the ground of extreme cruelty. 
The allegations of cruelty were denied in the answers filed 
by each party. The trial court found "that each of the 
parties to this action has been guilty of acts of cruelty to-
wards the other, and that such acts of cruelty by each toward 
the other, were provoked by the acts of the other." The 
court decided that "each party has been guilty of recrimina-
tion and neither is entitled to a divorce from the other." The 
court entered judgment that plaintiff take nothing by her 
complaint and that defendant take nothing by his cross-
complaint. Plaintiff appeals" from the judgment signed and 
entered by the court" and from the order denying her mo-
tion for a new trial. Since the latter order is nonappealable, 
the appeal therefrom must be dismissed. 
The evidence regarding cruelty is in conflict; it supports 
the finding that each party has been cruel to the other. Plain-
tiff's evidence ·tended to show that defendant was frequently 
intoxicated to excess, that he inflicted physical injury upon 
plaintiff on several occasions, that he boasted of his relations 
with other women, that he unreasonably criticized plaintiff's 
daughter, that he unjustly berated plaintiff concerning a for-
mer suitor, and that, a1thou~h he was a lavish spender in 
other ways, he was penurious with plaintiff. Defendant's 
evidence indicated that plaintiff had unjustly accused him 
of dishonesty and homosexuality and had communicated to 
his business associate similar false and malicious statements. 
Since the trial court found that defendant was ~ui1ty of 
arts of cruelty towards plaintiff, it is clear that the judg-
ment denying plaintiff n rlivorce is not on the ground that 
plaintiff failed to prove the all(>~ations of cruelty in her 
complaint. The judgmcnt thus must be based either on the 
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finding that defendant's cruelty was provoked by plaintiff 
or on the ground that defendant established the defense of 
recrimination. 
The finding that the cruelty of each party was provoked 
by the other party is inconsistent with the conclusion that 
recrimination was established. [1] Cruelty that is provoked 
(loes not give rise to a cause of action. (Truax v. Truax, 62 
Cal.App.2d 441, 444 [145 P.2d 88] ; Popescu v. Popesc11, 46 
Cal.App.2d 44, 49 [115 P.2d 208].) [2] To establish re-
crimination, however, a cause of divorce mustbe shown. (Civ. 
Code, § 122; "Mayo v. Mayo, 3 Ca1.2d 51, 56 [43 P.2d 535] ; 
Sm1'th v. Smith, ]]9 Cal. 183, 189-190 [48 P. 730, 51 P. 183] ; 
Haskill v. Haskill, 56 Cal.App.2d 204, 208 [132 P.2d 294].) 
[3] Provocation and recrimination, therefore, are not com-
plementary, but mutually exclusive, defenses. [4] To jus- i 
tify extreme cruelty by one spouse under the doctrine of I 
provocation, the misconduct of the other spouse must itself 
be a serious violation of marital obligations. (See Eiden-
muller v. Eidenmuller, 37 Cal. 364, 364c365; Popescu v. Pop-
escu, supra, 46 Cal.App.2d 44, 50.) [6] The record in the 
present case fails to disclose any such violation on plain-
tiff's part that would justify the physical brutality and other 
misconduct of defendant. Defendant's acts of cruelty, as 
set forth in plaintiff's evidence, took place from the date of 
marriage until the separation of the parties, whereas de-
fendant freely conceded at the trial that his allegations of 
plaintiff's cruelty were based solely upon plaintiff's accusa-
tions that he was dishonest and a homosexual, charges that 
were made no earlier than two or three days before the sep-
aration. Thus, although the evidence would support the find-
ing that defendant's cruelty provoked the false accusations 
made by plaintiff, there is no evidence of any earlier miscon-
duct by plaintiff that would justify defendant's cruelty. 
Under these circumstances, the decision of the trial court 
rannot be supportE'd upon the theory of provocation rather 
than recrimination. 
The determinative question on this appE'al, therefore. is 
whethE'r the findings and conclusions in tbis case warrant 
app1iC'ation of the 110ctrine of rerrimination. It is apparent 
from tilP Trmarks of the trial jul1~e lit the rlose of the trial 
thnt h(' beJif'wd that th(' transgressions of each part? neees-
sal'i1~' pTecll1~el1 th<' grantin~ of a ilivorce to either. On 
thr otllf'r hani!. thr lan~lla~(> of s(>C'tion ]22 of the Ch·n Col1<' 
indielltes thai the trial court may haye abused its discretion 
Nov. 19;)2J Dk: BURGH v. DE BURG II 
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in disregarding the requirement therein that the cause of 
divorce of which one party is found guilty must be "in bar" 
of that party's ground of divorce against the other party. 
To resolve this conflict, wc have studied the history of the 
doctrine of recrimination, its objectives, and the wording and 
legislative background of the applicable statutes. 
[6] It has sometimes been assumed that any cause of 
divorce constitutes a recriminatory defense. The legislative 
language, however, is ill-adapted to such a broad purpose. 
Read together, sections 111 and 122 of the Civil Code pro-
vide: "Divorces must be denied upon . . . a showing by the 
defendant of any cause of divorce against the plaintiff, in bar 
of the plaintiff's cause of diyorce." Had the Legislature 
meant to make every cause of divorce an absolute defense, 
it could easily have provided that: "Divorces must be denied 
upon ... a showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce 
against the plaintiff.' , We are bound to consider the addi-
tional requirement that such a cause of divorce must be "in 
bar" of the plaintiff's cause of divorce. 
Much of the confusion concerning recrimination in Cali· 
fornia has proceeded from the erroneous discussion of the 
subject in Conant v. Conant, 10 Cal. 249 [70 Am.Dec. 717), 
which was decided before recrimination became a part of the 
statutory law. It was stated in that case that this defense 
is based on the doctrine that one who violates a contract con-
taining mutual and dependent covenants cannot complain 
of its breach by the other party. Logically, such a theory 
would permit the party against' whom the first marital offense 
was committed to ignore thereafter the duties imposed by 
the marriage "contract," for in contract law a material 
breach excuses further performance by the innocent party. 
(Restatement of Contracts, § 274; Cal. Civ. Code, § 1689(2).) 
[7] In fact, however, the defense may be asserted without 
regard to whether the plaintiff or the defendant was the first 
at fault. (Pullen v. Pullen & Holding, 123 L.T.R. 203, 86 
T.L.R. 506.) 
[8] The deceptive analogy to contract law ignores the 
basic fact that marriage is a great deal more than a contract. 
It can be terminated only with the consent of the state. 
[9] In a divorce proceeding the court must consider not 
merely the rights and wrongs of the parties as in contract liti-
gation, but the public interest in the institution of marriage. 
The family is the basic unit of our society, the center of the 
) 
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personal affections that cnnoblcand enrich human life. It 
channels biological drives that might otherwise become so-
cially destructive; it ensures the care and education of chil-
dren in a stable environment; it establishes continuity from 
one generation to anot.her; it nurtures and develops the in-
dividual initiative that distinguishes a free people. Since 
the family is the core of our society, the law seeks to foster 
and preserve marriage. But when a marriage has failed and 
the family has ceased to be a unit, the purposes of family 
life are no longer served and divorce will be permitted. 
[10] "[P]ublic policy does not discourage divorce where 
the relations between husband and wife are such that the 
legitimate objects of matrimony have been utterly destroyed." 
(Hill v. H~U, 23 Ca1.2d 82, 93 [142 P.2d 417] ; Weu v. We'll, 
37 Ca1.2d 770, 783-784 [236 P.2d 159] ; see, also, Saltzgaver 
v. Saltzgaver, 182 Md. 624, 636-637 [35 A.2d 810] ; opinion 
of Bickley, J., in Chavez v. Chavez, 39 N.M. 480, 489 [50 P.2d 
264, 101 A.L.R. 635].) . 
The chief vice of the rule enunciated in the Cona:p.t case is 
its failure to recognize that the considerations of policy that 
prompt the state to consent to a divorce when one spouse has 
been guilty of misconduct are often doubly present when both 
spouses have been guilty. The disruption of family relation-
ships, the clandestine associations with third parties, and 
the oppressive effect upon children and the community are 
intensified. It is a degradation of marriage and a frustra-
tion of its purposes when the courts use it as a device for 
punishment. 
Moreover. the historical discussion of the doctrine of re- I 
crimination in the Conant case is inaccurate. The court 
relied mainly on the decisions of the eminent English ecclesi-
astical jurist, Lord Stowell. It is si~ificant that in his later 
utterances Lord Stowell viewed with regret the illogical and 
pernICIOUS consequencp.s of a mechanical application of the 
doctrine.1 Even the medieval canon law, upon which Lord 
1"1 eannot blind myself to the fact, that the modem course of life 
and manners does not furnish those corrections of the mischiefs that 
may follow, which the Canon I.aw had anticipated in connection with its 
rule. There is no return to eohabitation, nor are there any means to be 
resorted to for the purpose of compelling it. In the state of separation, 
whether authorized or merely conventional, which usually takes place, 
there is certainly the inereased danger of a spurious offspring; and as 
the regulation of property exists among us, the danger of separate debts, 
to the great e'\"entual injury of the husband and his legitimate family." 
(Proctor v. Proctor, 2 Bag.Con. 292, 302, 161 Eng.Rep. 747, 751.) 
) 
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Stowell relied, did not carry rrcrimination to the extreme of 
the Conant casc; althongll permitted as a bar when the plain-
tiff songht a diyol'cf' for adnltery, this defense was 110t ac-
repted against u ('a\lse of (li\'orce ha,;r(l on cruelty, for the 
«hurch Juwyf'I'S }'('alizf'(l that jlllhlil' policy was not served by 
forcing a wife, e\'ell if guilty, to retnrn to a home where her 
life was in dallg-PI'. (Sanchez, Dr Sando :Matrimonii Sacra-
mento, Lib. X, Disp. 18, No.5, cited by Neuner, Modern 
Divorce Law, 28 Iowa L.Hev. 272, 279, n. 21. See, also, 
opinion of Lonl Stowell in Chamber~ v. Chambers, 1 Hag. 
Con. 439, 452, 161 Eng.Rep. 610, 614.) 
In any event ecclesiastical authorities are not relevant in 
vie,v of the fact that ecclesiastical courts could not grant abso-
lute divorce. They could decree only limited divorce, equiva-
lent to a judicially recognizrd separation. Such a court's 
action was usually limited to a drtermination of certain prop-
erty rights of the parties or the husband's duty of support.2 
It is not surprising, therefore, that ecclesiastical lawyers i 
placed morc emphasis upon tlle comparative guilt of the parties 
than Parliament did in cases of absolute divorce. Parlia-
mcnt appears to haye tempered the doctrine of recrimination 
with discretion. On the question of recrimination in cases of 
absolute divorce, the Conant opinion, necessarily looking for 
its authorit~· to parliamentary practice, relied exclusively 
upon Simmons' Case, 12 C. & F. 339, 8 Eng.Rep. 1438, in 
which Parliament denied a divorce,s overlooking other cases 
involving recrimination where Parliament allowed divorce. 
(See, for example, Major Campbell's Case, 42 H. of L. Jour. 
]41, reprinted in MacQueen, 1 .... Practical Treatise on the Ap-
pellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords [1842], p. 590.) 
'Even in this area, the ecclesiastical law and common law were not in 
agreement. For a collection of cases, see Beamer, The Doctrine of Be .. 
crimination in Divorce Proceedings, 10 Univ. of Kansas City L. Rev. 
213, 222 .. 236. 
'Strictly speaking, Simmons' Case did not turn upon recrimination. 
Adultery on the part of the plaintiff bnshand was alleged, but the House 
of Lords refused to decide whether or not that recriminatory defense had 
been proved. Instead, tlle divorce was denied on the ground that the 
busband had dl'iycn Ilis wife and d:lUgllter into the streets and, in spite 
of ample menns, IHid refused to support them; this conduct on his part 
directly led to the wife's becoming 1\ street·walker and prostitute. In 
reality, therefore, Simmons' Case is to be viewed as an example of the 
doctrine of proYocntion. (Cf. Johnsoll v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 459, 460; 
Truax v. Truax, 62 Cal.App.2d 441, 444 [145 P.2d 88); Popescu v. 
Popescu, 46 Cal.App.2d 44,49 [115 P.2d 208); Annen v. Annen, 79 Cal. 
App. 626, 627·628 [250 P. 580).) 
39 C.2d-2B 
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Only a year before the Conant decision, in fact, Parliament 
had created jurisdiction in the English courts to grant abso-
lute divorce and in so doing expressly provided for judicial 
discretion on the issue of recrimination. (Divorce and Matri-
monial Causes Act of 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § 31.) 
The California Legislature, in enacting the Civil Code in 
1872, did not follow the principles of the Conant case. The 
code provisions on recrimination made two important depar- . 
tures from the existing law. 
[11] First, the code requires that the defendant prove a 
cause of divorce against the plaintiff to establish this defense. 
The requirement of the Conant case that plaintiff be "without' 
reproach" no longer prevails. (Mayo v. Mayo, 3 Cal.2d 51, 
56 [43 P .2d 535] ; Smith v. Smith, 119 Cal. 183, 189-190 [48 
P. 730, 51 P. 183] ; White v. White, 82 Cal. 427, 452 [23 P. 
276, 7 L.R.A. 799] ; Haskill v. Haskill, 56 Cal.App.2d 204, j 
208 [132 P.2d 294] ; Popescu v. Popescu, 46 Cal.App.2d 44, 
49 [115 P.2d 208] ; Hilton v. Hilton, 54 Cal.App. 142, 149 
[201 P. 337] ; Klemme1' v. Klemmer, 42 Ca1.App. 618, 622 [187 
P. 85].) The dictum to the contrary in Shapiro v, Shapiro, 
127 Cal.App. 20, 24 [14 P.2d 1058], is without support even 
in the textbook authority cited and is clearly opposed to the 
statute. 
Second, as shown by the notes of the commissioners who 
drafted the code, the Legislature rejected the strict rule of 
recrimination of the ecclesiastical courts. Significantly, 
neither the Conant case nor any other divorce cases appear 
among the precedents listed by the commissioners as the basis 
of the statute. It is apparent from the decisions that were 
listed that the Legislature intended that divorce cases involv-
ing recrimination be governed by the same principles that 
apply generally throughout our jurisprudence. Although the 
plaintiff's fault has always been regarded as an important 
element in the decision of any case, our courts have tradi-
tionally refused to exalt that element above the public in-
terest. Thus, in Freeman v. Sedwick, 6 Gill. (Md.) 28, 40 
[46 Am.Dec. 650], a fraudulent conveyance case cited by the 
commissioners, Mr. Justice Story's Equity Jurisprudence is 
quoted as follows: "Relief is not granted, where both parties 
are truly in pari delicto, unless in cases where public policy 
would thereby be promoted." (Vol. I, p. 317, § 298; see, also, 
14th ed. [1918], vol. I, pp. 395-398, § 421.) [12] This re-
spect for the public interest has formed the basis of a recog-
nized exception to the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, 
) 
) 
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with which the defense of recrimination has become increas-
ingly identified since the enactment of the code. [13] It is 
dear that the Legislature, in relying upon judicial principles 
of general application, intended that in divorce litigation the 
fault of the plaintiff should have no more significance than 
!'lsewhere in the law. Apparently with this purpose in mind 
it worded the statute to require that a cause of divorce shown 
by defendant must be "in bar" of the plaintiff's cause of 
divorce. It would have defeated its own purpose had it closed 
the avenues to divorce when the legitimate objects of matri-
mony have been destroyed. The perpetuation of an unwhole-
some relationship would be a mockery of marriage. 
The California cases decided since the enactment of the 
Civil Code contain little analysis or discussion of the prin-
ciples governing the defense of recrimination. In Brenot v. 
Brellot, 102 Cal. 294, 296 [36 P. 672], this court correctly 
stated the rule to be that C C a court of equity is authorized to 
enter a judgment dismissing an action of divorce, where both 
parties are seeking a decree, and the evidence discloses them 
to be equally guilty of the misconduct alleged." (Italics 
added.) Again, in Glass v. Glass,4 Ca1.App. 604, 607 [88 P. 
734], the appellate court, in affirming the judgment with re-
gard to propert.y issues, observed wit.hout objection that the 
trial court had found both parties guilty of extreme cruelty 
but nevertheless had granted the plaintiff a divorce. In some 
cases, however, it has been assumed, apparently with the 
acquiescence of the parties themselves, that the mere showing 
of a cause of divorce against the plaintiff is sufficient. (See 
Sweasey v. Sweasey, 126 Cal. 123, 129-130 [58 P. 456] j Matt-
son v. Mattson, 181 Cal. 44, 47 [183 P. 443]; HelpZing v. 
Helpling, 50 Cal.App. 676, 680-681 [195 P. 715]; Gough v. 
Gough, 101 Cal.App.2d 262, 268-269 [225 P.2d 668].) This 
failure to exercise the discretion authorized by the statute 
has enabled the thinking engendered by the Conant case to 
survive by default. Important developments of the past 
several decades have made it increasingly clear that the courts 
can no longer decline to exercise the discretion inherent in 
the clean hands doctrine. 
The rising divorce rate in the United States has compelled 
a growing recognition of marriage failure as a social problem 
and correspondingly less preoccupation with technical marital 
fault. This trend is strikingly exemplified by the recent 
4111wndment of section 92 of the Civil Code d('signatin~ in-
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curable insanity as a ground for divorce. Formerly, no mat-
ter how vicious the conduct of an insane spouse, he could 
not be divorced, for the law refused to find in him the guilt 
essential to a marital offense. (See Cohn v. Cohn, 85 Cal. 
108, 109 [24 P. 659] ; Wray v. Wra,y, 19 Ala. 522, 525; 4 
A.L.R. 1333; 42 A.L.n. 1531.) The Legislature has come to 
realize, howewr, that when a union is dominated by insanity, 
fulfilment of tIle norlllal purposes of marriage is hopeless. 
'What was once a bar to divorce is now recognized as a justi-
fication for diyon·e. Still more striking ill recognition of this 
trend has been the enactment of legislation in many states 
authorizing divorce when the spouses have lived apart for a 
required number of years. Marriage failure, rather than the 
fault of the partirs, is the basis upon which such divorces are 
granted. (See George v. George, 56 Ney. 12, 17-18 [41 P.2d 
]059, 97 A.L.R. 983] ; Lemp Y. Lemp, 62 Nev. 91, 101-102 
[141 P.2d 2]2, 148 A.L.R. 1104] ; 51 A.L.R. 763; 97 A.L.R. 
985; 111 A.L.R. 867; 152 A.L.R. 336; 166 A.L.R. 498. Of. 
Pavletich v. Pavletich, 50 ::\.1\1.224,229-234 [174 P.2d 826].) 
It would be froward indeed for the conrt, when it is called 
upon to evaluate an alleged recriminatory defense, to ignore 
the growing awareness that a marriage in name only is not 
a marriage in allY real S(,l1S(,. In otller fields, equity does not 
deny relief on the ground of plaintiff's unclean hands when 
to do so would be harmful to tlle public interest. (See Johnson 
v. Yellow Oab Transit Go., 321 U.S. 383, 387 [64 S.Ot. 62::'., 
88 L.Ed. 814]; Leo Feist, Inc. Y. Y01lng, 138 F.2d 972, 974-
976; Clet"eland, C .. C. d': Sf. L. Ry. Co. v. Hirsch, 204 F. 849, 
857-858 [123 C.C.A. ]45] ; Menzel v. Niles 00., 86 Colo. 320, 
325-326 [281 P. 364, 65 A.L.R. 995] ; Baylor v. Orooker, 97 
Kan. 624. 627-628 [156 P. 737, Ann.Ca.;;. 1918D 473] : Deutsch-
mann v. Board of Appeals of Oanton, 325 Mass. 297, 299 [90 
N.E.2d 313] ; Oameron Y. International AlHonce of Theatrical 
Stage Emp., 118 N.J.Eq. 11, 20-21 []76 A. 692, 97 A.L.R. 594] ; 
Cosdcn Oil d': Gas Co. v. Hendrickson, 96 Okla. 206, 210 [221 
P. 86] ; cf. Hobbs Y. Boatl'ight, ]95 Mo. 693, 715, 720-724 [93 
S.W. 934, 113 Am.SLRep. 709, 1) IJ.R.A.N.S. 906]. See, also. 
1 Story on Equity [14th ed. 1918]. §421, pp. 396-398; Pome-
roy on Equity [5th ed. 1941], §941, pp. 733 et seq.; Chafee, 
Som(' ProblclIls of Eqnit:v [1950], p. 95; 48 hR .A. 842; 120 
A.L.n. 1461: ]3 C.J .. Contracts. § 441. p. 497: RO C .• T.S., 
Equit~·. §§ 98a. 9Sb, pp. 487-491; ]2 Am.Jur., Contraets. § 214. 
pp. 729-731.) [14] Snch a rule is ('ven more appropriate 
in marital litigation. ,,'jl('re the social consequences of the 
) 
Nov. 19G2] DE BURGH tI. DE BURGH 
L39 C.2d 858; 250 P.2d 598) 
869 
court's decree are of thp utmost importance. (See Sullivan v. 
Sullivan, 219 Cal. 734, 736 [28 P.2d 914] [annulment]; 
Loughran v. Loughran. 2!J2 U.S. 216, 228-230 [54 8.Ct. 684, 
78 L.Ed. 1219] [marital property rights].) 
1t bears lloting how fl'l'C)lIcntly divorees are uncontested. 
Tn lllany eases licit lWI" spouse is " innocent," and yet, by agree-
ment, one of them defaults to ensnre a divorce. Thus a strict 
recrimination rulc fails in its purpose of denying relief to 
tIle guilty. Moreover, it exprts a corrupting influence on the 
negotiations that precede the entry of such a default. The 
spousp who more dpsperately seeks an end to a hopeless union 
is penalized by the ability of the other spouse to prevent a 
divorce tluough the assertion of a recriminatory defense, and 
the morp unscrupulous partner may obtain substantial 
financial concessiOlls as thp price of remaining silent. Were 
the clean hands dodrine properly applied, it would encourage 
estranged couples to bring their differences before the chan-
cellor, where the interests of societ~· as a whole can be given 
proper rerognition and where settlement negotiations can be 
supervised and unfair adyantage prevented. 
A mechanical application of the doctrine of recrimination 
is by no means uuiversal. In some states, the defense has 
been limited by requiring that the plaintiff's offense be of the 
same type as the defendant's or that it involve equal guilt. 
(See Bast v. Bast, 82 Ill. 584, 585; AppeltofJt v. Appeltofft, 
147 lid. 603, 605 (]28 A. 273] ; Hokamp v. Hokamp, 32 Wn.2d 
593, 596 [203 P.2d 357].) Such limitations are not entirely 
satisfactory, however; even when misconduct is identical the 
court should be permitted to exercise a sound discretion in 
the public interest. Several states expressly recognize judi-
cial discretion concerning recrimination. (Vanderhuff v. Van-
derhuff, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 153 [144 F.2d 509-510]; Stewart 
v. Stewart, 158 Fla. 326, 327-328 [29 So.2d 247, 170 AL.R. 
]073}; Roberts v. Roberts, 103 Kan. 65, 72 [173 P. 537]; 
Panther v. Pantlle1', 147 Olda. 131, 134 r295 P. 2]9]. See, also, 
Flagg v. Flagg, 192 Wash. 679,686 [74 P.2d 189].) 
In view of the reliance of the Conant case on what was 
thought to be the English rule, perhaps the most illuminating 
of the modern cases on the subject is Blunt v. Blunt, [1943] 
A.C. 517, 169 L.T.R. 33, decided in the House of Lords in 
] 943. Significantl~', the judges in England were for many 
years reluctant to exercise the discretion given them by the 
Act of 1857. Eventually, however, the courts fully ac-
cepted their responsibility (Wickens v. Wickens [1918], P. 
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265, 119 L.T.R. 268; Wilson v. Wilson [1920], P. 20, 122 
L.T.R. 223), and, in Blunt v. Blunt, Lord Chancellor Simon 
reviews the factors that should govern the decision in a given 
case. Among these are tIle prospect of reconciliation and the 
interests of the children of the marriage. III keeping with thc 
traditional view of the law toward both marriage and divorce, 
the Lord Chancellor states that the consideration of "primary 
importance" is the interest of thc community at large. This 
interest is "to be judged by maintaining a true balance be-
tween respect for the binding sanctity of marriage and the 
social considerations which make it contrary to public policy 
to insist on the maintenance of a union which has utterly 
broken down." ([1943] A.C. at 525, 169 L.T.R. at 34; cf. 
Hill v. Hill, 23 Ca1.2d 82, 93 [142 P.2d 417] ; Weil v. Weil, 
37 Ca1.2d 770, 783-784 [236 P .2d 159].) 
In examining the doctrine of recrimination, we have given 
the most serious consideration not only to judicial precedent 
but also to the work of leading scholars and practitioners. 
Few rules of law have been more widely condemned by the 
legal profession. In 1948, a committee of experts of the Amer-
ican Bar Association joined with the representatives of other 
interested groups in the work 'of the National Conference on 
Family Life. The bar association's representatives, acting 
as the legal section of the conference, strongly recommended 
the elimination of the defense of recrimination. (Report of 
Legal Section of National Conference on Family Life [1948], 
pp. 1,3, 7. See, also, Chafee, Some Problems of Equity [1950], 
p. 73 et seq.) In "iew of the statutory provisions on the 
subject, we are not free to go so far. Moreover, we do not 
believe that the comparative guilt of the parties will be with-
out significance in every case. [16] We do believe, how-
ever, that some of the evils pointed out by the bar associa-
tion committee can be avoided within the framework of the 
existing statute if it is kept in mind that the doctrine of 
recrimination, like the doctrine of unclean hands of which 
it is a part, is neither puristic nor mechanical, but an equitable 
principle to be applied according to the circumstances of 
each case and with a proper respect for the paramount in-
terests of the community at large. 
Defendant relies upon Oomfort v. Oomfort, 17 Ca1.2d 736, 
745-752 [112 P.2d 259]. The discussion of recrimination in 
that case, however, was directed entirely to the question 
whether or not the recriminatory defense there involved had 
become inoperative owing to lapse of time. The court did not 
/) 
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consider the language of section 122 of the Civil Code in the 
light of the clean hands doctrine, nor was that issue raised 
in the bricfs of t.he parties. The Comfort case therefore 
does not support the proposition that the doctrine of recrim-
ination precludes the exercise of equitable discretion. 
To the extent that the fol1owing cases support a mechanical 
application of the doctrine of recrimination, they are disap-
proved: SWl'as('.lI v. Sweasey. 126 Cal. 123, 129-130 [58 P. 
456] ; IIfatfson Y. lIIattson. 181 Cal. 44,47 [183 P. 443] ; Help-
ling v.Helpling, 50 Ca1.App. 676, 680-681 [195 P. 715]; 
Braze7l v; Braze7l, 54Ca1.App.2d 458, 459 [129 P.2d 117]; 
Gough Y. Gough. 101 Cal.App.2d 262, 268-269 [225 P.2d 
668]. 
[16] We have concluded that section 122 of the Civil 
Code imposes upon the trial judge the duty to determine 
whether or not the fault of the plaintiff in a divorce action 
is to be regarded as 'lin bar" of the plaintiff's cause of 
diYorce based upon the fault of the defendant. Tested by 
the considerations discussed above, the evidence in the present 
ease would haye been ample to support a finding that the 
parties' misconduct should not bar a divorce. Reconciliation 
appears impossible. The trial judge himself observed that 
I'tlle marriage here was a failure from the start" and that 
"there is nothing really to keep them together." There was 
eyidence that defendant more than once inflicted bodily in-
jur~' upon plaintiff; that after one severe beating plaintiff 
attempted to commit suicide by an overdose of sleeping pi11s; 
t.hat defendant often boasted in the presence of plaintiff and 
guests of intimate relations with other women and discussed 
th(>ir physical attributes in detail; that defendant was often 
intoxicated; that defendant frequently told plaintiff that her 
daughter by a preyions marriage had loose morals; that de-
f(>ndant was insanely jealons of a former suitor of plaintiff 
and on one oecasion seized an alarm elock giveu plaintiff by 
the Imitor and threw it into the toilet; and that defendant 
layishly tipped waiters and spent his money freely in public, 
but in prh-ate liferefllsed to give plaintiff sufficient funds 
to purchase clothes suitable for her station in life. On the 
other hand, d(>f(>ndant's evidence was to the effect that plain-
tiff had im-ented false accusations against him; that plain-
tiff had deliberat(>lr attempted to ruin his business life by 
writing a lett(>r to his partner falseI~· accusing dt'f(>l1dant 
of elisllOnest~· Ilnel hornos(>xllality; flllft that. plAintifF nail an-
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nounced her intention of writing similar letters to other bus-
iness associates of defendant. If the foregoing facts are true, 
it is apparent that tIl ere has been a total and irremedial 
breakdown of the marriage. Technical marital fault can play 
but little part in the face of the unhappy spectacle indicated 
by this evidence, with its inevitable effect upon the family, 
friends, n(>ighbors, and business interests of the parties. 
[17] Moreover, it is significant that the application of a 
strict rule of recrimination in the present action does not 
operate with equal justi(·c. As the spouse entrusted by law 
wit}l tlle management and control of the community property 
(see Ci". Code, §§ 161a, 172, 172a), defendant is in a posi-
tion to use that property for his personal benefit. Although 
he has an obligation to support plaintiff, a large discretion 
is customarily vested in the husband concerning the manner 
of performing that obligation; in the present case, disagree-
ment and repeated legal actions to obtain support money are 
almost certain to ensue. 
[IS] There can be no precise formula for determining 
when a cause of divorce shown against a plaintiff is to be 
considered a bar to his snit for divorce, for the divorce court, 
as a court of equity (Sharon v. Sharon, 67 Cal. 185 [7 P. 456, 
635,8 P. 709]), is clothed with a broad discretion to advance 
the requirements of justice in each particular case. [19a] In 
general, however, certain major considerations will govern 
the court's decision: 
1. The prospect of reconciliation. The court should de-
termine whether the legitimate objects of matrimony have 
been destro~'ed or whetlH'r there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the ·marriage can be saved. It should consider the ages and 
temperaments of the parties, the length of their marriage, 
the seriousness and frequency of their marital misconduct 
proved at the trial and the likelihood of its recurrence, the 
duration and apparent finality of the separation, and the 
sincerity of their efforts to overcome differences and live to-
gether harmoniously. 
2. The effect of the marital conflict upon the parties. If 
a continuation of the marriag(' would constitute a serious 
hazard to the llealth of either party, as in the case of physical 
bruta1it~·. the court shoulo bE.' reluctant to deny dh·orce. Al-
though finaneial considerations can play only 8 minor role 
in determ'ining the propripty of divorce, even these may not 
be entir('l~' ignored if tll(, ('videnc(' indicates that marital ('on-
flicts ar(' d('stroying the lh'elihood of the parties. 
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3. l'he effect of thc marital conflict upon third parties. 
In every divorce case in which children are involved, their 
interests arc of the utmost concern to the court. The dis-
ruptiYf~ effed. of (liYor('p upon children is to be deplored, 
but in Il givell ('asp it llIay bl' preferable to violence, hatred, 
or immoralitv "'hen tllesl' an' present in the home. The com-
munity as a ·who1e also has all interest. Adultery, desertion, 
or cruelty, for example, can only discredit marriage; their 
perpetuation is not lightly to be decreed . 
. 4. Comparat1:ve guilt. In many ways the guilt of the 
parties may be unequal-in the gravity of the misconduct in-
volved, in the frequency of its occurrence, or in its effect 
upon children and others. Moreover, one spouse may demon-
strate substantially greater repentance and reform. Marital 
offenders, therefore, arc not neeessarily in par·i delicto before 
the chan('e11or. Thc'ir comparative guilt may have an im-
portant bearing upon whether or not either one or both 
should be granted relief. 
We have concluded that in light of the foregoing discus-
sion the findings and conclusions in the present case are not 
sufficient to support the determination that recrimination was 
established. [20] It is essential that findings be made on 
every material issue raised by the pleadings. (Kusel v. Kusel, 
147 Cal. 52, 57 [81 P. 297] ; Faircht'ld v. Raines, 24 Ca1.2d 
818, 830 [151 P.2d 260] ; Parker v. Shell Oil 00.,.29 Ca1.2d 
503, 512 [175 P.2d 838] ; cf. LaMar v. LaMar, 30 Ca1.2d 898, 
902 [186 P.2d 678].) As we have seen, whether or not the 
cause of action proved against each spouse is to be regarded 
as in bar of the ('ause of action proved against the other spouse 
is a material issue and must be expressly decided by the trial 
court before it may be said that recrimination has been de-
cided. [19b] To deeide the issue raised by a plea of recrim-
ination, the court must consider the prospects of reconcilia-
tion, the comparativc fault of the plaintiff and the defendant, 
and the effert of thc marital strife upon the parties, their 
rhildren, and the community. 
Ppon remand of the rase 'for application of the clean hands 
doctrine as herein indirated, the trial court may decide that 
one of thc parties should be granted a divorce. [21] In 
that event, alimony and more than half of the community 
property ma~' be awarded to the prevailing spouse as in any 
other ease. It is also possible, however, that a divorce will 
he granted to both parties (see Flagg v. Flagg, 192 Wash. 
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679, 686 [74 P.2d 189]; Blunt v. Blunt, [1943] A.C. 517, 
531 [H.L.]), and it seems advisable to indicate here the rules 
that should govern the granting of alimony and the appor-
tionment of community property under such circumstances. 
[22J When a divorce is granted to both, alimony may be 
awarded to either, for the basis of liability for alimony is 
the granting of a divorce against the person required to 
pay it. (See Civ. Code, § 139.) [23J Section 146 of the 
Civil Code provides that if the divorce is granted for extreme 
cruelty, the court may apportion community property as 
it deems just, but that statute has been interpreted to per-
mit an award of more than half of the community prop-
erty only to an innocent spouse. (Eslinger v. Eslinger, 47 
Cal. 62, 64.) When a divorce is granted to both parties, 
neither is innocent within the meaning of this rule, and the 
community property must be equally divided. 
The judgment is reversed. The appeal from the order deny-
ing the motion for a new trial is dismissed. Defendant is 
to bear the costs of this appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-Solely upon the ground that there are con-
tradictory, irreconcilable findings about matters material to a 
proper disposition of the ease, I concur in the reversal of the 
judgment.· (Canfield v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 13 Ca1.2d 
1, 20 [87 P.2d 830] ; Hollywood Cleaning «; P. Co. v. Holly-
wood L. Service, Inc., 217 Cal. 131, 137 [17 P.2d 712] ; Los 
Angeles etc. Land Co. v.ltlarr, 187 Cal. 126, 132 [200 P.1051] ; 
Estep v. Armstrong, 91 Cal. 659, 663-665 [27 P. 1091]; 
Learned v. Castle, 78 Cal. 454, 460 [18 P. 872, 21 P. 11].) In 
view of the conflicting evidence, it would be inappropriate for 
this court to determine which finding is supported by the 
greater weight of the evidence and to order judgment ac-
cordingly. (Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Ca1.2d 265, 270 [239 
P.2d 625] ; T1tpman v. Haberkern, 208 Cal. 256,269-270 [280 
P. 970].) 
In my opinion, these conclusions are determinative of the 
appeal. If, upon retrial, the evidence should disclose that 
each party has a cause of divorce" against the other, as I read 
the Civil Code, tIle trial court will have no alternative but 
to deny each of them a divorce. (Civ. Code, § 111[4].) Like· 
wise, if it should be proved that the conduct of each was pro-
voked by the other, a divorce must be denied either party 
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because neither one will have shown a cause of divorce. Cruelty 
which is provoked by thc party seeking a divorce is not action-
able. (Ha,rp v. Harp, 204 Cal. 193, 194 [267 P. 101] j Popescu 
'\". Popescu, 46 Cal.App.2d 44, 49 [lIn P.2d 208].) However, 
it may be that, although the evidence disclose cruelty on the 
part of each party, provocation for the acts of one upon the 
part of the other may bc proved. In that event, the trial court 
properly might award a divorce to the party whose actions 
were provoked by the other. 
This court cannot anticipate what the e,·idence upon another 
trial may disclose. The conclusion that the findings are in 
irreconcilable conflict disposes of the issue before us and the 
lengthy discourse upon the doctrine of recrimination is un-
necessary and unwarranted dictum. Ho,vever, because of my 
disagreement with the interpretation placed upon the statu-
tory law of this state, I am compelled to state my views upon 
that question. 
"The legislature has seen fit to make the doctrine [of re-
crimination] an integral part of the law of this state. It 
is not for the courts to determine the rightness or wrongness 
of the doctrine so declared. That is a legislative and not a 
judicial function." (Comfort v. Comfort, 17 Cal.2d 736, 
752 [112 P.2d 259].) 
In effect, the court now repeals sections 111 (4) and 122 
of the Civil Code. Section 111 provides: "Divorces must be 
denied upon showing: . . . 4. Recrimination j • • ." (Em-
phasis added.) Section 122 defines recrimination as "a sho,v-
ing by the defendant of any cause of divorce against the 
plaintiff, in bar of the plaintiff's cause of divorce." 
Ignoring the mandatory "must" of section 111, the ma-
jority hold that the trial court may exercise its "discretion" 
in determining whether to grant a divorce where each party 
has shown a cause of divorce against the other. Using the 
language of Brenot v. Brc'I'Iot, 102 Cal. 294, 296 [36 P. 672], 
it is said that C C a court of equity is authorized to enter a judg-
ment dismissing an action of divorce, where both parties are 
seeking a decree, and the evidence discloses them to be equally 
guilty of the misconduct alleged." But in the Brenot case 
no authority was cited for this conclusion, and the court did 
not consider the statute. Furthermore, the quoted statement 
is erroneous ill implying that the parties must be equally gui1t~­
of the same misconduct. Under s('ction 122, "any cause of 
divorce" is a sufficient basis for the defense of recrimination. 
The cause need not bf' the same as that relied upon b~' thp 
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other party. (See White v. White, 82 Cal. 427, 452 [23 P. 
276, 7 L.RA. 799] ; Klemmer v. Klemmer, 42 Cal.App. 618, 
622 (187 P. 85].) 
Reliance also is placed upon Glass v. Glass, 4 Ca1.App. 604, 
607 [88 P. 734]. There tlle trial court found both parties 
guilty of extreme cruelty, but granted the plaintiff a divorce. 
The doctrine of reerilllinatioll was not relied upon by either 
of th<' parties, nor consiLll'l"l'(l by tIle court, and the ueeision 
is not allthority for tlw proposition that tIle manilatory lan-
guage of sectioll 1] 1 may be disregarded. 
III the present opinion "recrimination" is not defined. 
IIo"'ever, the illevitable implicatiOll of the analysis of the 
problem is that there is no such thing. It is acknowledged 
that a cause of divorce must be proved before the doctrine of 
recrimination may be applied. The conclusion is then reached i 
that, after the defendant's cause is established, the trial court 
must determine whether it is "in bar" of the relief sought 
b~T the plaintiff. 
The fallacy of s11ch circuitous reasolling lies in the mis-
interpretation of the pJain language of the statute. It is 
assumed that the phrase "in bar of the plaintiff's cause of 
divorce" refers back to the words "an~' cause of divorce." 
However, the strueture of the sentence preeludes allY such 
interpretation. The phrase beginning with "in bar" is a 
modif~'ing one deliberately separated from the preceding 
modifying language by a comma. As diagrammed in Klemmer 
v. Klemme!', supra, the sentence reads: "Recrimination is a 
showin{} by the defendant (If any l'anse of divorce against the 
plaintiff, ?'n bar of the plaintiff's calise of divorce." (See De 
Haley v. Haley, 74 Cal. 489, 492 [16 P. 248, 5 Am.St.Rep. 
460].) The word "showing" is modified by two separate, and 
equal, phrases. The first, "by the defendant Qf any canse of 
divorce against tJle plaintiff," explains the kind of "showing" 
which must be made. Such showing, if made, is "in bar of 
the plaintiff's cause of divorce." 
The majority say: "Had the Legislature meant Jo ma"c 
every cause of divorce an absolute defense, it could easily have 
pro,:,ided that: 'Divorces must be denied upon . . . a show-
ing by the defendant of any cause of divorce against the 
plaintiff.' " They ignore the fact that section 122 is a defini-
tion of "recrimination" as used in section 111. In defining 
"recrimination" as a sllOwing "in bar of the plaintiff's causp 
of divorce," the code {'ommissioners simply adopted the ac-
cepted judieiaj definition of that term as stated in Conant 
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v. Conant, 10 Cal. 249, 256 [70 Am.Dec. 717], and the English 
cases there cited. 
According to thc majority opinion, "The California Legis-
lature, in enacting the Civil Cone in 1872, did not fo])ow the 
principles of thl' Con;mt ease. 'rhe code provisions on re-
crimination made two important departures from the exist-
ing law." 'l'hese, it says, were the requirement that the de-
fendant prove a cause of divorce against the plaintiff and 
the rejection of the strict rule of the ecclesiastical courts. 
But t1l(> code did not change the law as stated and applied 
in the Conant case. By that decision the court did notestab-
}ish a doctrine that the plaintiff be "without reproach" to 
secure a divorce. It held that "where the matter pleaded 
is such as would entitle the defendant to a decree, had it 
been presented in a bill brought by himself, the relief should 
be denied." (P. 256.) In using the words "without re-
proach," it specifically limited them to "similar guilt, or an 
offence to which the law attaches similar consequences." (P. 
258.) Because the now abandoned doctrine of two types of 
divorce then existed, the court did provide that a lesser guilt 
would bar a divorce a '1:inculo matrirnonii. However, it is 
important to note that a divorce would be granted a mensa 
ct thol'o where the guilt of the plaintiff was not sufficient to 
have established a cause of divorce in the defendant. 
In the Conant case the court also rejected the strict rule 
of the ecclesiastical courts. They had allowed only adultery 
as a bar to a suit for divorce. Under the Conant decision any 
offense stated by the statute could be pleaded in bar to the 
same or any other offense. This departure from the ecclesias-
tical rule was adopted by the code commissioners. It is un-
derstandable, therefore, t.hat they should have relied upon the 
general principles upon which the Conant case was decided, 
rather than upon earlier divorce cases. 
The note of the code commissioners states: "This section 
[sec. 122] rests upon the principle that he who is himself in 
the wrong cannot be heard to complain in a Court of justice 
of another's wrong pertaining to the same matter." The anal-
ogy which they used is strikingly similar to that stated in 
the Conant case where it was said: "It is a general principle 
of the common law that whoever seeks redress for the viola-
tion of a contract resting upon mutual and dependent cove-
nants, to obtain success, must himself have performed the 
obligations on his part." That the code commissioners had 
I 
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a related principle in mind is clear from their citations of 
authority. Of the decisions to which they referred, five de-
nied relief to a plaintiff relying upon an illegal or fraudulent 
contract. In each case, the basis of the holding was the doc-
trine of in pari delicto. (Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. K. B. 
341 [Eng.]; Gregg v. Wyman, 4 Cush. (58 Mass.) 322; 
Roby v. West, 4 N.H. 285 [17 Am.Dec. 423); Freeman v., 
Sedwick,6 Gill (Md.) 28, 29, 39-40 [46 Am.Dec. 650] ; Greg- I 
ory v. Haworth, 25 Cal. 653, 657.) Bush v. Brainard, 1 Cow. 
(N.Y.) 78 [13 Am.Dec. 513), stated the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence as a defense to an action for gross negligence. 
Hyatt v. Wood, 4 Johns. (N.Y.) 150 [4 Am.Dec. 258), held 
that a person having only the naked possession of land can-
not maintain an action in trespass against a person having 
possessory title who has entered by force and evicted the 
possessor. 
None of the decisions cited by the commissioners considered 
the public policy argument now presented. The full quota-
tion from Freeman v. Sedwick, supra, the only one of those 
cases here relied upon, is as follows: "After a careful exam-
ination of the authorities, we are brought to the conclusion 
that Courts of equity have held, and uniformly decided, that 
it was both the wisdom and policy of the law to withhold 
all aid or relief from parties in controversies between them-
selves, who stood strictly in pari delicto, which might or could 
tend to the consummation of agreements entered into in fraud 
of the law, or the rights of any person. Mr. Justice Story, in 
his Commentary on Equity Jurisprudence, vol. 1, p. 317, sec. 
298, says: 'The suppression of illegal contracts is far more 
likely, in general, to be accomplished by leaving the parties 
without remedy against each other, and by thus introducing 
a preventive check, naturally connected with a want of con-
fidence, and a sole reliance upon personal honor. And so, 
accordingly, the modern doctrine is established. Relief is 
not granted, where both parties are truly in pari delicto, 
unless in casE'S where public policy would thereby be pro-
moted.' " 
The notes of the code commissioners, annotated by two of 
them, were first published by H. S. Crocker and Company 
in an 1872 edition of the Civil Code. In the preface to the 
annotated edition, those commissioners stated: "In some places 
the Code modifies or alters what has heretofore been the law. 
Wherever this occurs the reason for the change is given-the 
hardships which existed under the former law, and how the 
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present enactment applies to prevent their future occur-
rence." (P. vi.) 
Following out this purpose the commissioners noted every 
instance in which it was their intention to depart from the 
preexisting law. Illustrative of their comments are the fol-
lowing: "Sections 170 and 171 modify the common law in 
two respects." (§ 170, p. 58.) "This was the rule of the 
common law. The Commission deemed it advisable to modify 
it." (§ 710, p. 215.) "The words 'or for' are intended to 
supersede the doctrine of Sieman v. Austin, 0 0 ." (§ 853, 
p. 249.) "This section is a departure from the rule laid 
do'Wn in .. 0 (the cited) case." (§ 908, p. 260.) "The 
three preceding sections change the rule of our statutes 
" (§ 1286, p. 359.) "This is an innovation upon the 
common law ... 0" (§ 1496, p. 443.) "This is contrary to 
the former law upon this subject .... " (§ 1500, p. 444.) 
"This Chapter undoubtedly modifies the rule heretofore exist-
ing in this State as to mistake of law." (§ 1576, p. 467.) 
"This section modifies the law heretofore existing." (§ 1714, 
p. 519.) "This section, and !'lome of the ensuing ones, dif-
fer materially from the common law . 0 ." (§ 1864, p. 
573.) Further examples of this careful attention to altera-
tions in the prior law appear in the annotations to sections 
245, 296, 400, 954, 1383, 1384, 1488, ] 624, 1658, and 1941. 
Had the code commissioners intended to modify the doc-
trine of recrimination, as stated in the Conant case, so dras-
tically as it is now said that they did, certainly they would 
have been as explicit in the annotation to section 122 as they 
were in their notes to other sections. It is clear that the 
commissioners made every effort to leave nothing to implica-
tion and to stress each alteration or clarification which was 
intended by their work. If it was their intention to adopt, 
as a limitation upon the defense of recrimination, the dictum 
exception to the doctrine of in pari delicto mentioned in the 
fluot.ation from Mr. Justice Story by the Maryland court 
in the Freeman case, it would have been a simple matter to 
word the statute accordingly. Instead, the commissioners 
provided that "any cause of divorce against the plain-
tiff" is a sufficient showing in bar of the plaintiff's cause 
and requires a denial of relief. Rather than stating any modi-
fieation or alteration of what was theretofore the law, they 
bolstered the unequivocal language of the statute by explain-
inJ! that "he W110 is himself in the wrong cannot be heard 
) 
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to complain." The authorities which they cited denied relief 
in each instance. Certainly if they had intended any such 
exception as is now added to the code section, they would 
have modified the language of the statute, mentioned that 
purpose in their annot;ltion, ur at least have cited authori-
ties applying the exception to the gcneral rule. 
By now saying that "tit!' cunsiderations uf policy that 
prompt the state to consent to a divorce when one spouse 
has been guilty of misconduct arc often doubly present when 
both spouses have been guilty," ill effect, this court repeals 
the statutory rule of recrimination. Thus, in any case where, 
by the terms of the statute, recrimination is a bar, it should 
not be applied because of public policy. Only the embalmed 
corpse of the doctrine is preserved, impotent in the shroud 
of standards establislled "for determining when a eanse of 
divorce shown against a plaintiff is to be considered a bar 
to his suit for divorce." 
Among other standards which the trial court must now use 
to determine whether the cause proyed is "in bar" of the 
plaintiff's cause of divorce is one called" comparative guilt." 
No authority is giwn for this invention, startling as applied 
to the grounds for divorce, and indeed, none can be found 
for it. Section 92 of the Civil Code provides that dh'orces 
mar be granted for anyone of seven enumerated causes. No 
distinction is made between them, nor are there varying de-
grees of any cause. All stand on an equal footing insofar as 
the granting of a dh'orce is concerned. "In this State, the 
statute has specified ef'rtain acts or conduct which shall con-
stitute !!rounds of divorce and so far as the matrimonial 
contract is concerned. the Courts cannot distinguish between 
them, whatever difference there may be in a moral point of 
yjew." (Conant Y. Conant, supra" p. 256.) 
'Yheth(lr a caus(' of di\'OJ'ce is E'stablish('il is simply a matter 
of proof. If the cvidel1c(' is sllffir.ient to sl1stnin n decrec npon 
nn~' one of thE' stntlltory g"l'oullils, a ('nllse of diYorce is proyed 
nnd cllnmlative (,yjc1ellce (lo('s 110t ~iyf' it !!rrater Ilallctity. 
Eitlwl' n calise of (lh'o1'l't' is establislH'<l or it is not. Once 
I'"tnhlbhl'd. it ill T1('ithl'r·mo)·p 1101' ll'lls ('ff(,(·tiw thnn all~' otlH'r 
('nllSl' «IS t hc' basis fo)' a (li \'ore'l' or a hal' to t11(' ot111'1' SpOllSE' 's 
,'allSl' of 11i \'01'('1' , A1HI ~·et. it i" no\\' held. th('st' ":1l1""S. I'qnal 
IIlJ{lf'l' the In\\'. mllst in SoltH' lll('tllph~-"i('al fashion hI' 1I1ea'-;Url'<l 
II)' weighed hy tlll' trinl .ilH1~e. By comparin~ the' ('qnal, iT1-
,·qunli1y 1IIm- 111' cli~l'nYl'l'l'(l RI'~'on(l thl' snpl'rla1 ive of "I'X-
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abl(' infinity which is more than utmost, an unimaginablr Of'· 
grpr of I'rllrlty whil·h is grcatl'r than the greatest. 
That tlw lloetl'iJ1c of rrerimination has bren repealed is madr 
cJ'ystal clc'ar by thr snggrstion "that a divorce will be grant cd 
1 II both parti('~." Tllr. !:o(le mil kes no proyjsiol1 for snch a dp· 
('J'l'r and thr 1'('1; \I It isconl l'ary to tIle reljuirernent that a 
<li\'o}'!:,' "mllst 1)(' ,h'lliC',l" WllPll rrcriminatiol! is proy{'(l. 
"Ccrtain l'OlIS('qll('II('('S UI'(' attadll'tl to tlw <I"l'I'('(', illllr-pendenl 
(If the dissollltioll of thr llIarriage ('ontrad, an(l they are geJl-
nally 11101'(' fa;-orabl,' to thr part~· obtainillg the relief tlla1l 
to the contrstant; but a decree cannot be granted in favor 
of on('. and aftrrwanls in favor of the other, as the first wOlll(l 
diss(,jyl' the marriaf!r, and tl1l'n no marriagp would subsist. 
n}1OIl whi('h thr second decrrc could act; and a drcree granting' 
a di\'orce ill favor of cach, would br an anomalous proceed-
ing." (Conant Y. Conant, supra.) 
The Civil C(>(le contemplates that a divorce can be awarded 
to only olJe party. Sel'tion 131 provides in part: "If it elf'- i 
1ermines that the ojYoree ought to be granted, an interlocutory 
judgment mnst be entered, dl:'claring that the party in "hose 
fin-or the conrt deci(les is entitled to CI diYoree; ... " (Em-
phasis added.) 
It is lJOteworthy than the only American anthority citeo 
for the proposition that both parties may be awarded a decree 
is Plagg v. Plagg, 192 ,\Yash. 679, 686 [74 P.2d 189], decided 
in H jurisdietioll which has no statnte relating to recrimina-
tion. Eycn there, no authority was cited for the holding, nor 
has the dedsioll since been follcnwd. 
The anomaly of awardillg a llivor!:e to both parties is fur-
ther stressed b~' the discussion of alimony and property rights. 
The majority say: "When a divorce is granted to both, ali-
mony may be awarded to either, for the basis of liability for 
alimony is the granting of a diYorce against the person reo 
quired to pay it. (See Ciy. Code, § 139.)" But section 139, as 
lllllelllled in 1!)51, eOlltr11lplates, in the singular, only "the' 
party against whom the decree or judgment is granted." No 
provision is made for the situation where a decree is grantl:'d 
against both parties. That sneh an eventuality was not antiri. 
pated by the Legislature is obvious from section 14~, which 
pl'ovides: "",,'lwll the prcl'ailing party in the action has either 
a separah' fostatt', or is PHl'lling his or her own lh·elihood .... 
the court ill its discretion, may withhold any all0"an('e to the 
pl'fl'nililll7 pal'iy out of th(' separate property of tl1P other 
party." (Emphasis a<1(kd.) Cle'arly, the Legiglatnre (lid not 
882 DE BURGH V. DE BURGH [39 C.2d 
foresee a prevailing party against whom the decree might be 
granted. 
By statutf', 32 Anlf'rie<lll jurisnictions allm\' the defense of 
recrIllllJ1ntioll. In only tllrt'!' of these Illay the ("o11rt, in its 
(liscrrtioll. grant a diY(\l'l'r nftr1' proof of ree1'iminatiol1. Ex-
('rpt for theRC thrre, rc('riminatiol1 is, by statute. an absolute 
oefrl1sc in the majority of s1:11rs. (2 Yrl'niel', ;\me1'ican Family 
Laws. p. 87.) 1'hr decisions from ot])r1' states and England, 
hrre citrd as rrcog-nizilll! jndicial clisrretiol1, all rely upon 
different statutes or drelare judicial p(ilic~- in the absence of 
statute. The poliry "'hid] l111<1r1'lirs these exeeptions to the 
g'rllcral rule may be commendablr. Bnl this conrt sho11ld not 
usurp the ]rgislatiYe p1'erogatiYe by the dcyice of interpreting 
n statute which llreds 110 intrrpretntioll, ano which has been 
accepted v;ithout question for 80 ~-enrs. If public policy 
no longer approves tl](' (loctrine of rrcrimination, then it is for 
the Legislature, ano not for the court, to repeal the statute. 
Spence. J., concurred. 
SHENK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the 
judgment of reversal on tIle ground that the findings are 
contradictory and irreconcilable. I disagree with the mean-
ing given to the phrase "in bar of the plaintiff's cause of 
divorce" which appears in section 122 of the Civil Code. It 
seems to me that those ,yords were inserted in the statute 
for a purpose foreign to that no\\' asrribed to them. 
Section III of the Civil Code reads: "Divorces must be 
denied upon showing ... 4. Recrimination." The limita-
tion of that defense in an action for divorce is continued in 
section 122. That section defines "R,ecrimination" as "a 
showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce against the 
plaintiff, in bar of the plaintiff's cause of divorce." Separate 
maintenance is an available remedy ,,-I]ere a canse of divorce 
exists (Civ. Code, § 137), but because of a showing of re-
crimination a divorce may not be granted (§ 111). 
There is thus no warrant for disapproving or overruling 
prior cases. When, as in this cas(', the conrt is faced with a 
sJlOwing of recrimination (any cause of divorce) on the part 
of each spouse in resisting a divorce sought by the other, 
there is no choice except to deny the divorce to both. On a 
record whicl] undeniably supports a finding of recrimination 
on the part of each sponse, the trial court must be assumed 
to have rxrrcisrd all of thr discretion that it had if the denial 
of thf' divorce was based on that finding. 
